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This Note evaluates recent developments in Alaska’s eyewitness identification 
admissibility doctrine under the 2016 case Young v. Alaska. For the past four 
decades, federal and most state courts have relied on the Supreme Court’s 1977 
ruling in Manson v. Brathwaite, which identified five admissibility factors—
known as the “Biggers factors”—for establishing the reliability of eyewitness 
identifications made under the influence of unnecessarily suggestive police 
procedures (“systemic variables”). In recent decades, however, social and 
psychological science has demonstrated the flaws in the five Biggers factors as 
reliability indicators and the impact of non-suggestive circumstantial (or 
“estimator”) variables on eyewitness identification reliability. In Young, 
Alaska joined New Jersey and Oregon as the third state to break from 
Brathwaite, employing a new and evolving admissibility test with scientific 
support, consideration of both systemic and estimator variables, and a call for 
corresponding jury instructions. 
 
 In 2016, the Alaska Supreme Court broke step with nearly forty 
years of established criminal procedure through its decision in Young v. 
Alaska,1 adopting a new test for the admission of eyewitness 
identifications. In Young, Alaska opened pre-trial hearings on the 
reliability of eyewitness identifications to evidence and consideration of 
both systematic and circumstantial flaws that may affect those 
identifications.2 Until recently, both federal and state courts, following the 
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 1.  374 P.3d 395 (Alaska 2016). 
 2.  Id. at 427. 
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United States Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Manson v. Brathwaite,3 
have employed a narrow definition what constitutes a suggestive 
procedure and set aside concerns about reliability even when faced with 
clearly manipulated identifications.4 Young looks squarely at the 
unreliability of eyewitness identifications and suggests new and greatly 
improved mechanisms for assessing it. In doing so, Alaska aligns itself 
with other states that have drawn on recent social science to update the 
court’s treatment of problematic eyewitness identifications.5 
Young carefully confronts and—where appropriate—uproots 
longstanding conceptions about the reliability of eyewitness 
identifications, accounting for modern scientific insights about the 
malleability of such identifications. For example, careful study has helped 
identify the difference between system variables—suggestive influences 
manufactured by the state—and estimator variables—circumstantial 
factors which internally influence eyewitnesses and may also lead to 
flawed identifications.6 Following the lead of other state courts that have 
departed from Brathwaite, Young incorporates numerous psychological 
and sociological studies in creating additional procedural steps that 
address system variables, while calling for further development of 
guidelines that can combat estimator flaws.7 For instance, Young created 
 
 3.  432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977) (declaring that reliability is the “linchpin in 
determining the admissibility of identification testimony” and providing five 
factors to test reliability). 
 4.  See, e.g., Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 241 (2012) (limiting 
review for admissibility of eyewitness identifications to suggestive conduct 
arranged by police, such as “improper lineups, showups, and photo arrays”); 
Brathwaite, 432 U.S at 114 (addressing only five factors which may be manipulated 
by suggestive policing procedures); Holden v. State, 602 P.2d 452, 456 (Alaska 
1979) (stating that an accusation of a suspect by means of a single photograph is 
improper, yet that its admission is not necessarily reversible error because it may 
still be reliable, “as weighed against the corrupting effect of the suggestive 
identification itself”). 
 5.  See, e.g., State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 919–22 (N.J. 2011) (devising a 
new reliability test based on a wide range of non-exclusive factors to determine 
admissibility of eyewitness identifications); State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 696–97 
(Or. 2012) (creating an eyewitness identification admissibility test based on the 
Oregon Evidence Code’s admissibility rules, including those on personal 
knowledge and unfair prejudice, with a presumption of unreliability and unfair 
prejudice arising from suggestive police procedures). 
 6.  See Young, 374 P.3d. at 417–26 (identifying system and estimator variables 
and describing their psychological impact on witnesses through a thorough 
review of peer-reviewed literature). 
 7.  See, e.g., State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 919–22 (N.J. 2011) (citing peer-
reviewed studies). Young bases much of its analysis on other studies, including 
Roy S. Malpass et al., The Need for Expert Psychological Testimony on Eyewitness 
Identification, in EXPERT TESTIMONY ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION 3, 14 (Brian L. Cutler ed. 2009) (recognizing the rigor of testing and 
peer-reviewed quality control required for principles to gain general acceptance 
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an additional procedural step that uses evidentiary hearings to address 
system and estimator variables.8 While this step does not altogether 
eliminate the various dangers that eyewitness identification flaws create,9 
it does effectively shift the focus from a myopic procedural view of the 
benefits of eyewitness identifications to a broader appreciation of the 
positive and negative impacts of such evidence on criminal trials.10 
Although Alaska is not the first state to depart from the Brathwaite 
doctrine and adopt such a test,11 this Note looks at Young’s innovation in 
Alaskan criminal procedure and suggests that other states should 
consider if such a break from historical doctrine could also serve their 
criminal justice systems well and more closely align with their state 
constitutional guarantees of due process. 
The Alaska Supreme Court’s decision in Young builds on the 
decisions of other state courts that have broken with federal 
jurisprudence. While the federal courts have focused on a narrow concern 
with police suggestiveness, as reinforced in 2012 by the Supreme Court in 
Perry v. New Hampshire,12 Young broadens the focus in Alaska by taking 
into account recent trends in other states, advanced social science on 
suggestiveness and circumstantial reliability factors, and the often 
weighty impact of flawed eyewitness identifications in wrongful 
convictions.13 Basing its holding on these doctrines and scientific 
progress, the Alaska Supreme Court has created a flexible, adaptable 
method for protecting criminal proceedings from many of the corrupting 
effects of unreliable eyewitness identifications. Young not only forges a 
path forward for Alaska but also serves as a beacon of progress for states 
 
in the scientific community); ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 21 
(Harvard Univ. Press 1996) (detailing the three steps in the process of memory 
and dispelling the notion that memory operates like a recording). There are also a 
multitude of studies on the effects of state-induced and circumstantial variables 
that impact reliability summarized in REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER, State v. 
Henderson, A-8-08, at 79 (N.J. June 18, 2010). 
 8.  See Young, 374 P.3d at 427. 
 9.  Henderson, 27 A.3d at 922 (“[w]e recognize that scientific research relating 
to the reliability of eyewitness evidence is dynamic; the field is very different 
today than it was in 1977, and it will likely be quite different thirty years from 
now”). 
 10.  See generally Young, 374 P.3d at 416–26 (broadening admissibility 
considerations far beyond a five-factor reliability test and balancing the need for 
eyewitness identifications with the risks they present). 
 11.  See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 919–22 (detailing New Jersey’s eyewitness 
admissibility test on which Young is substantially based). 
 12.  565 U.S. 228, 241 (2012) (holding that a due process remedy will only be 
considered for an “unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure” and that 
Brathwaite “comes into play only after the defendant establishes improper police 
conduct”). 
 13.  See generally Young, 374 P.3d at 413–26. 
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in the lower forty-eight still in need of comprehensive procedural reform 
beyond the Brathwaite and Perry precedents.14 
I. THE JURISPRUDENTIAL BACKGROUND 
A.  The Brathwaite Doctrine 
Modern federal eyewitness identification jurisprudence—which the 
majority of states still follow—stems from the Supreme Court’s 1977 case, 
Manson v. Brathwaite, which considered the issue of excluding suggestive 
eyewitness out-of-court identifications from criminal trials under the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.15 In that case, Nowell 
Brathwaite was charged with, and convicted of, possession and sale of 
heroin in Connecticut state court.16 The prosecutor tied Brathwaite to the 
heroin exclusively through an identification made by an undercover state 
trooper, who had purchased drugs from a man behind an apartment door 
that had been opened twelve to eighteen inches.17 After the purchase, the 
trooper returned to police headquarters and spoke with other officers, 
where he described the seller’s appearance.18 One of those other officers 
went to the police’s records department and retrieved a photograph of 
Brathwaite, who he suspected might be seller.19 The trooper who made 
the purchase identified Brathwaite based on review of that single 
photograph, rather than a photo array, and identified Brathwaite in court 
eight months later.20 
The district court considered two constitutional issues: whether the 
police used a suggestive tactic to obtain the out-of-court identification, 
and if so, whether that suggestive tactic, under the totality of the 
circumstances, led to a “substantial likelihood of irreparable 
misidentification.”21 Three eyewitness identification doctrines 
promulgated by the Supreme Court laid the main foundation for 
Brathwaite’s analysis of the admissibility of the undercover agent’s 
identification and, more broadly, the admission standard still employed 
 
 14.  Id. at 416 (“In the belief that a new approach—based on a better 
understanding of the factors affecting the reliability of eyewitness 
identifications—will lead to the exclusion of unreliable evidence and thereby 
reduce the risk of wrongful convictions, we conclude that breaking away from 
our long reliance on the Brathwaite test will do more good than harm.”). 
 15.  Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 99 (1977). 
 16.  Id. at 101–02. 
 17.  Id. at 107. 
 18.  Id. at 101. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. at 101–02. 
 21.  Id. at 107. 
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in federal courts today: Stovall v. Denno,22 Simmons v. United States,23 and, 
perhaps most significantly, Neil v. Biggers.24 
The first of these cases, Stovall, opened the door to the possibility of 
exclusion for identifications obtained through police procedures that are 
unnecessarily suggestive.25 However, its holding by no means provided 
for automatic exclusion whenever an identification passed the 
unnecessarily suggestive threshold.26 Stovall imposed a totality of the 
circumstances test on eyewitness identifications subject to suggestiveness 
to determine the permissibility of admission.27 Before allowing the 
petitioner in Stovall—suspected of stabbling the witness after killing her 
husband—time to retain counsel, the police escorted him into the 
witness’s hospital room for identification.28 Although individually 
presenting a suspect to a witness for identification is and was, at the time 
Stovall arose, a widely-condemned practice, the Court said that the 
“imperative” nature of the witness’s identification, given the 
circumstances, outweighed the concerns about suggestiveness 
surrounding the identification.29 The Supreme Court found the admission 
of the identification therefore did not violate the petitioner’s right to due 
process,30 as “a claimed violation of due process of law in the conduct of 
a confrontation depends on the totality of the circumstances surrounding 
it,” and the necessity of the identification heavily factored into that 
equation.31 
Brathwaite also built on the holding of Neil v. Biggers, decided five 
years after Stovall, which examined the reliability of an eyewitness 
identification procured from a show up (where officers bring a suspect 
back to the crime scene to be identified by witnesses there).32 The Biggers 
 
 22.  388 U.S. 293 (1967). 
 23.  390 U.S. 377 (1968). 
 24.  409 U.S. 188 (1972). 
 25.  Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302. 
 26.  Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 113. 
 27.  Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302. 
 28.  Id. at 295. 
 29.  Id. at 302. In Stovall, the Court of Appeals en banc noted that the witness, 
who identified the defendant in her hospital room, was the only person who could 
exonerate him. Id. Her identification was deemed “imperative,” although the 
defendant was the only black man in the room at the time of the identification, 
conducted in the presence of police officers. Id. 
 30.  Id. at 296. 
 31.  See id. at 302 (considering the following factors in the “totality of the 
circumstances”: the spouse was the one person who could exonerate the 
defendant; the hospital was close to the courthouse and jail; the risk that the 
witness would not live much longer; the witness could not visit the jail; and taking 
the defendant to the hospital was the only way to conduct an identification, as, 
under the circumstances, a lineup was not possible). 
 32.  See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 201 (1972) (holding that the admission of 
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Court inquired whether, “under the ‘totality of the circumstances’ the 
identification was reliable even though the confrontation procedure was 
suggestive,”33 and announced five factors to help determine the reliability 
of an eyewitness identification made under suggestive conditions.34 The 
factors were: 
[T]he opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time 
of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the 
witness’ prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty 
demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length 
of time between the crime and the confrontation.35 
By limiting the scope of the inquiry to the relationship between 
suggestiveness by police and misidentification, Biggers concluded that if 
the identification was reliable under the stated factors, then even a 
suggestive procedure would not bar its admission on due process 
grounds.36 
Following Biggers, two approaches regarding the issue of suggestive 
eyewitness identifications emerged in the circuit courts.37 The first 
approach, recognizing the issues raised in Stovall and Biggers but 
discontent with their preference for inclusion of still potentially unreliable 
identifications, called for exclusion of identifications obtained through 
unnecessarily suggestive procedures, regardless of reliability (commonly 
referred to as the “per se approach”).38 The second approach, informed 
by the totality of the circumstances test in Stovall and the reliability 
calculus promulgated in Biggers, rejected a per se rule of exclusion in favor 
of balancing the results of these two factual inquiries.39 This approach 
admitted that eyewitness identification may be suggestive, but could 
nevertheless be admitted because the Biggers factors indicated some 
reliability.40 
While the Brathwaite Court recognized that the exclusion of all 
identifications procured through unnecessarily suggestive police 
procedures could create a deterrent effect,41 the Court adopted a totality 
 
an identification made pursuant to a showup and voice identification of the 
suspect, where he was accompanied by two detectives walking him past the 
victim seven months after the rape in question, did not violate due process). 
 33.  Id. at 199. 
 34.  Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199–200. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 106 (1977). 
 37.  Id. at 110. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. at 112. 
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of the circumstances approach in order to balance the societal benefit of 
positively influencing police behavior through the exclusionary rule with 
the cost of excluding relevant and “reliable” evidence from consideration 
by the trier of fact.42 In concluding its evaluations of these approaches, 
Brathwaite declared: “reliability is the linchpin in determining the 
admissibility of identification testimony for both pre- and post-Stovall 
confrontations.”43 Brathwaite established the Biggers factors as the 
prevailing federal doctrine in determining the admissibility of eyewitness 
identifications subject to unnecessarily suggestive police procedures.44 
Brathwaite’s determination of unnecessary suggestiveness, combined with 
Biggers’ admissibility determination for identifications deemed 
unnecessarily suggestive, remains the two-pronged test in federal courts, 
despite its reliance on outdated psychological conceptions of reliability 
and the absence of meaningful procedural protections against the many 
inherent flaws of eyewitness identifications.45 
B.  Henderson, Perry, and The Federal-State Divide 
Thirty-four years after Brathwaite announced its admissibility test for 
eyewitness identifications procured by unnecessarily suggestive police 
procedures, New Jersey initiated a movement away from the totality of 
the circumstances test.46 In 2011, in State v. Henderson, the Supreme Court 
of New Jersey adopted an eyewitness identification admissibility test 
grounded in scientific reseach.47 But in 2012, the Supreme Court further 
entrenched the outdated Brathwaite doctrine in the federal courts through 
its holding in Perry v. New Hampshire.48 These two cases, decided just five 
months apart, brought to light a deep division between the federal and 
 
 42.  See id. at 110–12 (evaluating the costs and benefits of the per se and totality 
rules on the factors of reliability, deterrence, and the effect on the administration 
of justice). 
 43.  Id. at 114. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  See State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 919–22 (N.J. 2011). Henderson, the first 
state decision to broaden the scope of due process protections against 
suggestiveness and estimator variables, incorporated modern social scientific 
understandings about the effect of police procedure on identifications as well as 
inaccurate assumptions about the inherent validity of eyewitness identifications. 
See generally id. 
 46.  See id. at 877–922 (rejecting many of the principles of Brathwaite, 
explaining modern understandings about eyewitness reliability, and establishing 
a new admissibility test). 
 47.  See id. at 919–22 (detailing new admissibility requirements and due 
process protections). 
 48.  See Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 245 (2012) (refusing to broaden 
the domain of due process protections beyond Brathwaite’s recognition of 
suggestive procedures and application of the Biggers factors). 
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state courts in answering the question: under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendment right to due process of law, should courts develop 
procedures to protect against eyewitness identification flaws that go 
beyond the scope of direct and pre-arranged suggestive police 
techniques—and if so, what should those be?49 
The Supreme Court Speaks Again in Perry 
 
Perry highlighted the current federal eyewitness admissibility 
doctrine’s emphasis that reliability inquiries arise only where an improper 
police influence has potentially impacted the identification.50 In other 
words, improper influence serves as a threshold for any judicial inquiry 
into the reliability of an identification, regardless of surrounding 
circumstances arising outside of police control.51 The petitioner in Perry 
was convicted on state theft charges.52 The eyewitness identification in 
question occurred in response to a police officer asking a witness, who 
had indicated that she had seen a man breaking into cars in her apartment 
building’s parking lot, to describe what she had seen.53 When the officer 
asked her for a more specific description of the man, she pointed out her 
kitchen window at the petitioner, who was standing in the parking lot 
with another officer.54 Perry argued that the admission of this 
identification at his trial was error, as suggestive circumstances alone 
“suffice to trigger the court’s duty to evaluate the reliability of the 
resulting identification before allowing presentation of the evidence to the 
 
 49.  Compare Henderson, 27 A.3d at 922–23 (expanding the variables judges in 
pre-trial admissibility hearings should consider beyond unnecessary suggestion 
and the Biggers factors), with Perry, 565 U.S. at 241 (limiting any opportunity for 
exclusion of an identification to instances of “unnecessarily suggestive” 
identification procedures). 
 50.  Perry, 565 U.S. at 231 (holding that if “indicia of reliability are strong 
enough to outweigh the corrupting effect of the police-arranged suggestive 
circumstances, the identification evidence ordinarily will be admitted, and the 
jury will ultimately determine its worth”). 
 51.  Id. at 261–62 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court sets “a high 
bar for suppression[] [and] [t]he vast majority of eyewitnesses proceed to testify 
before a jury” as a result of the narrowly defined due process protection 
recognized in federal courts pursuant to eyewitness identifications); see also 
Dunnigan v. Keane, 137 F.3d 117, 128 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Bouthot, 878 
F.2d 1506, 1516 (1st Cir. 1989); Thigpen v. Cory, 804 F.2d 893, 895 (6th Cir. 1986); 
Green v. Loggins, 614 F.2d 219, 223 (9th Cir. 1980) (declining in each case to find 
due process violations on claims of improper police influence). 
 52.  Perry, 565 U.S. at 234. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. 
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jury.”55 The Court disagreed with the petitioner’s proposed rule to subject 
any suggestive eyewitness identification to judicial prescreening.56 
 Discussing the reasons for its rejection of the petitioner’s requested 
standard, the Court noted that the reliability “linchpin” announced in 
Brathwaite “comes into play only after the defendant establishes improper 
police conduct.”57 Without evidence of suggestion, the second prong of 
Brathwaite—determining reliability once a procedure is found to be 
suggestive—does not apply and cannot result in the exclusion of an 
identification.58 This is true even if the conditions surrounding the 
identification were tainted with indicia of unreliability, such as the effects 
of stress the witness experienced when making the identification, how 
long the witness observed the suspect, or biases associated with the race 
of the witness and the suspect.59 The Court in Perry effectively limited 
constitutional due process protections against flawed eyewitness 
identifications to a narrow set of unfair police practices.60 Even though the 
Court had long acknowledged that “the annals of criminal law are rife 
with instances of mistaken identification,”61 it defined improper influence 
in a way that placed circumstantial and inherent flaws in identification 
procedures beyond judicial reach, as such flaws cannot easily be linked to 
overt suggestion. In the aftermath of Perry, courts remain relegated to the 
suggestiveness framework provided by Brathwaite, while factors 
identified by modern social science as equally likely to cause improper 
influence go unaddressed. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Perry further illustrated the federal 
courts’ traditional failure to serve an activist role in improving criminal 
procedure and their delay in accounting for scientific developments.62 
 
 55.  Id. at 236. 
 56.  Id. at 240. 
 57.  Id. at 241; see also id. at 245 (“The fallibility of eyewitness evidence does 
not, without the taint of improper state conduct, warrant a due process rule 
requiring a trial court to screen out such evidence for reliability . . . .”). 
 58.  Id. at 243–44. 
 59.  Id.  
 60.  See id. at 232–33 (limiting the definition of such unfair practices to 
suggestive circumstances arranged by law enforcement officers, such as lineups, 
showups, and photographic arrays). 
 61.  United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967). 
 62.  See, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE 
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 63 (2011) (referring to Brathwaite’s test as 
“toothless” in ensuring due process); Michael H. Hoffheimer, Requiring Jury 
Instructions on Eyewitness Identification Evidence at Federal Criminal Trials, 80 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 585, 586–87 (1989) (explaining federal courts have generally 
encouraged but not mandated powerful eyewitness identification jury 
instructions); Robert Couch, A Model for Fixing Identification Evidence After Perry v. 
New Hampshire, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1535, 1536 (2013) (noting Perry’s failure to set a 
post-Brathwaite standard exemplifies that real reform must be state-led). 
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The Supreme Court has taken some steps to identify and correct 
procedural problems often involved in misidentifications, such as the 
issue of independent origins of in-court identifications in United States v. 
Wade, where the Court held that a trial court must hold a hearing to 
determine whether an in-court identification has an independent source 
where it is unclear whether it originated from a defendant’s observations 
or a police lineup subject to improper influence.63 However, state courts 
and legislatures have more frequently and quickly implemented much 
deeper change. For example, states have diligently worked to develop 
investigatory committees, new statutes, and procedural remedies to 
address issues of admissibility of misidentifications, poor jury 
instructions regarding reliability of eyewitness identifications, false 
confessions, and other unreliable evidence which often leads to wrongful 
convictions.64 Federal courts, in contrast, have largely relegated the search 
for solutions to the states and adopted few measures to combat common 
procedural issues in areas such as eyewitness identifications, hearsay, and 
false confessions.65 This apathy and lack of urgency within the federal 
system to account for science is especially dangerous in the context of 
eyewitness identification procedures because assumptions about 
eyewitnesses in traditional jurisprudence are not only lagging or 
incomplete, they are often entirely opposite from the truth.66 
New Jersey Breaks with Brathwaite 
 
At the state level, the New Jersey Supreme Court has led the way in 
appreciating how important modern social science should impact courts’ 
review of eyewitness identifications through its decision in Henderson. 
Henderson not only identified Brathwaite reliability factors that may have 
a counterintuitive impact on reliability such as confidence, degree of 
attention, and opportunity to view the crime, but integrated new 
scientifically-supported reliability factors into its new eyewitness 
identification admissibility test.67 The case involved an eyewitness who, 
 
 63.  Wade, 388 U.S. at 242. 
 64.  GARRETT, supra note 62, at 241–52. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER, supra note 7, at 79 (noting three of five 
reliability factors utilized by Brathwaite test are in fact unreliable, as they are often 
“strengthened by the suggestive conduct against which they are to be weighed”: 
confidence, degree of attention, and opportunity to view the suspect). 
 67.  State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 919 (N.J. 2011) (laying new framework 
for admissibility test which would “consider all relevant factors that affect 
reliability in deciding whether an identification is admissible; that is not heavily 
weighted by factors that can be corrupted by suggestiveness; that promotes 
deterrence in a meaningful way; and that focuses on helping jurors both 
understand and evaluate the effects that various factors have on memory”). 
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unable to identify the picture of the defendant in a photographic lineup 
following the crime, was told by an officer to “just do what you have to 
do, and we’ll be out of here.”68 During a pre-trial hearing to the validity 
of the identification, the witness testified that he felt he was being nudged 
into making a certain choice.69 Subjecting the identification to the 
Brathwaite test—requiring determination of whether the police 
procedures were unnecessarily suggestive and, if so, whether the 
identification was admissible nonetheless because it met the Biggers 
factors—the trial court found the identification admissible under the 
totality of the circumstances.70 The Appellate Division reversed, however, 
concluding that the photographic lineup was impermissibly suggestive, 
and thus required exclusion, because the investigating officers, by their 
statements to the witness, deliberately intruded in order to influence the 
witness’s choice.71 
Before the Supreme Court of New Jersey, the parties and amici 
suggested that Brathwaite and New Jersey’s own photographic 
identification test, in State v. Madison,72 were ill-adapted to scientific 
research relevant to eyewitness identifications.73 A report produced by 
the Special Master reviewed over 360 exhibits, including over 200 
scientific studies of the influence of human memory on eyewitness 
identifications.74 It also considered testimony from seven experts in the 
fields of psychology, criminal defense, and wrongful convictions during 
a ten-day remand hearing.75 In response to the studies and testimony 
 
 68.  Id. at 881. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. at 881–82. 
 71.  Id. at 884. 
 72.  536 A.2d 254, 255, 265 (N.J. 1988). Madison addressed whether out-of-
court, police-conducted photographic identification procedures were so 
impermissibly suggestive that they gave rise to a substantial likelihood of an 
irreparable mistaken identification. Id. The court, falling in line with Brathwaite 
and Wade, held that the defendant had to sufficiently establish undue 
suggestiveness to receive a reliability hearing, and if so, the burden shifted to the 
State to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the identification’s source 
was independent. Id. 
 73.  Henderson, 27 A.3d at 884. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. at 884–85. The Innocence Project, amicus curiae, called Dr. Gary L. 
Wells, Distinguished Professor of Psychology at Iowa State University; Professor 
James M. Doyle, Director of the Center for Forensic Practice at John Jay College of 
Criminal Justice; and Dr. John Monahan, Distinguished Professor of Law at the 
University of Virginia with a Ph.D. in Clinical Psychology. Id. The defendant 
called Dr. Steven Penrod, Distinguished Professor of Psychology at the John Jay 
College of Criminal Justice; and Professor Jules Epstein, Associate Professor of 
Law at Widener University School of Law. Id. The State called Dr. Roy Malpass, 
Professor of Psychology at the University of Texas, El Paso. Id. Drs. Wells, Penrod, 
and Malpass testified about scientific research in the eyewitness identification 
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presented, the Report of the Special Master encompassed a broad range 
of psychological findings on human memory, a field which had only just 
begun to receive the attention of researchers during the 1970s, prior to 
Brathwaite.76 The Report recognized, from the research and testimony 
presented, that human memory “does not function like a videotape, 
accurately and thoroughly capturing and reproducing a person or event,” 
but is “a constructive, dynamic and selective process.”77 Instead, human 
memory functions in three stages: the acquisition stage (where 
information is perceived and enters the viewer’s memory system), the 
retention stage (the period of time which passes between perception and 
the viewer’s attempt to recall the event), and the retrieval stage (where 
the viewer attempts to recall the event).78 
Because many variables can influence the reliability of the 
information stored at any stage in the memory process, divorcing 
considerations of suggestiveness from relevant reliability concerns, as the 
two-pronged Brathwaite test does, fails to allow for an evaluation of the 
true totality of the circumstances .79 If a witness’s self-reported certainty, 
degree of attention, and opportunity to view the suspect are positively 
correlated with the level of suggestion provided by the police in making 
the identification, it makes little sense to uphold the admission of the 
identification—even if found unnecessary and improperly suggestive—
because the circumstances of the identification as self-reported by the 
witness deem it “reliable.”80 
The factors that can influence memory and, specifically, eyewitness 
identification accounts fall into two categories: system variables and 
estimator variables.81 System variables include circumstances and 
procedures under the control of law enforcement or, more broadly, the 
criminal justice system.82 These factors include—but are not limited to—
blind administration (such as in conducting a lineup procedure), pre-
identification instructions, lineup construction, avoiding feedback and 
recording confidence, multiple viewings, simultaneous versus sequential 
 
field. Id. 
 76.  REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER, supra note 7, at 8–9. 
 77.  Id. at 9 (referring to research principles from ELIZABETH E. LOFTUS ET AL., 
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 2:2 (5th ed. 2014)). 
 78.  LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 77. 
 79.  Steven Penrod et al., The Reliability of Eyewitness Testimony: A Psychological 
Perspective, in THE PSYCHOL. OF THE COURT ROOM 119, 122–46 (1982). 
 80.  REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER, supra note 7, at 10. 
 81.  Gary L. Wells, Applied Eyewitness-Testimony Research: System Variables and 
Estimator Variables, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1546, 1546 (1978). 
 82.  Id. 
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lineups, composites, and show ups.83 The Brathwaite factors generally 
parallel these system factors. 
 In contrast, estimator variables—which are often highly influential—
are largely extraneous to the criminal justice system. They include 
characteristics of the witness or perpetrator and circumstances 
surrounding the identification itself.84 While estimator variables are also 
capable of negatively impacting the reliability of an eyewitness 
identification, they are not accounted for in Brathwaite’s suggestiveness 
and reliability test.85 Estimator variables include—but are not limited to—
stress, weapons focus, duration, distance and lighting, witness 
characteristics (such as age and intoxication), characteristics of the 
perpetrator (such as changes in facial features and disguises), memory 
decay, race-bias, private actors (non-State actors who expose the witness 
to opinions, photographs, descriptions, or other influential information), 
and the speed of the identification.86 The factors provided in Biggers—
opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime, degree of 
attention, accuracy of prior description of the criminal, level of certainty 
at the time of the confrontation, and the time between the crime and 
confrontation—while not innately reliable, are also considered estimator 
variables.87 
The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized that the Brathwaite test 
rested on three assumptions in order to protect due process: “(1) that it 
would adequately measure the reliability of eyewitness testimony; (2) 
that the test’s focus on suggestive police procedure would deter improper 
practices; and (3) that jurors would recognize and discount 
untrustworthy eyewitness testimony.”88 But the court noted that 
experience had proven these assumptions to be untrue.89 Therefore, it 
 
 83.  State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 896–903 (N.J. 2011). 
 84.  Wells, supra note 81, at 1546. 
 85.  Henderson, 27 A.3d at 904; see also Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 
245 (2012) (“The fallibility of eyewitness evidence does not, without the taint of 
improper state conduct, warrant a due process rule requiring a trial court to screen 
such evidence for reliability before allowing the jury to assess its 
creditworthiness.”). 
 86.  Henderson, 27 A.3d at 904–10. 
 87.  Id. at 921–22. 
 88.  Id. at 918 (citing Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 112–16 (1977)). 
 89.  See id. at 918–19 (explaining that Brathwaite fails to meet its goals because 
courts ignore the effect of estimator variables without a finding of impermissible 
police action; witnesses’ opportunity to view a crime, their degree of attention, 
and how certain they are at the time they make an identification are determined 
by self-reporting which is susceptible to influence by suggestive processes—
rather than deterring it; suppression is the only option for suggestive evidence 
and few courts will sanction it; and the reliability factors are, in practice, treated 
more like a checklist than a totality of the circumstances test). 
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found that the Brathwaite test had burdened due process.90 It also 
recognized the significant harm caused by misidentifications in 
jurisprudential history, relying on the alarming data presented on the 
connection between such flawed evidence and wrongful conviction 
rates.91 
Taking into account such high risk for miscarriage of justice, the New 
Jersey court formed a new flexible test that addresses system and 
estimator variables and incorporated the scientific findings provided in 
the Special Master’s report.92 Accordingly, under New Jersey’s Henderson 
test, to secure a pretrial hearing, the defendant must carry the initial 
burden of showing some evidence of suggestiveness which would result 
in a misidentification, generally tied to a system variable.93 Next, the 
burden shifts to the State to offer proof of reliability, whether in the form 
of system or estimator variables.94 The court may at any time end the 
hearing on grounds that the threshold claim of suggestiveness is 
baseless.95 The defendant, who carries the ultimate burden of proving a 
“very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification,” can cross-
examine eyewitnesses and police officers and present evidence linked to 
system or estimator variables.96 Then, based on the totality of the 
circumstances from the evidence presented, if the court finds a very 
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification, it should suppress 
the eyewitness identification.97 If not, upon admitting the identification to 
the trier of fact, the court should give tailored jury instructions to 
appropriately guide juries through the system and estimator variables 
that may have influenced the reliability of a given identification.98 The 
instruction may include a list of variables that may disrupt an accurate 
 
 90.  See id. (disapproving the following aspects of the Brathwaite test: (1) 
estimator factors are ignored unless impermissibly suggestive police conduct is 
shown, and only then may the five estimator factors announced in Biggers be 
considered; (2) three of the five Biggers factors may be skewed by suggestive 
procedures; (3) rather than deterring police suggestiveness, the Brathwaite test 
may reward it because more suggestion is correlated with higher confidence and 
more favorable reports about the viewing conditions; (4) Brathwaite only 
addresses the option of suppression; and (5) the totality of the circumstances 
mandate is undermined by the Biggers factors, which are often used as a checklist). 
 91.  Id. at 929; see also GARRETT, supra note 62, at 48 (finding eyewitnesses 
misidentified 76% of the exonerees in a 250-case study of wrongful convictions 
overturned by DNA evidence). 
 92.  See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 917 (acknowledging consistency in scientific 
experimentation on eyewitness identifications and variables that influence them). 
 93.  Id. at 920. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. at 924. 
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identification and language to warn jurors of potential flaws in otherwise 
seemingly correct identifications. For example, a model jury instruction 
reads: “ Although nothing may appear more convincing than a witness’s 
categorical identification of a perpetrator, you must critically analyze 
such testimony. Such identifications, even if made in good faith, may be 
mistaken.”99 
The Henderson test does two things for litigants of identifications. 
First, by broadening the factors that a judge in a pre-trial admissibility 
hearing can consider, it departs from the scientifically-fallible 
assumptions about the reliability of eyewitness identifications in 
Brathwaite and forces the State to prove a much higher degree of 
independent reliability from eyewitness identifications before it can be 
submitted to the trier of fact.100 Second, it inverts the burden of production 
in a peculiar way: shifting the responsibility to the defendant to show 
evidence of variables which detract from the identification’s reliability, 
rather than focusing on the five Biggers factors, evidence of which the State 
would carry the burden of providing under Brathwaite.101 Yet this actually 
works to the benefit of the defendant, as the range of admissible variables 
is much broader (possessing no definitive limit) and serves to defeat the 
identification’s reliability instead of only focusing on the availability of 
State evidence to support it.102 As for the judge, the Henderson test still 
affords a measure of discretion on the issue of whether expert testimony 
on reliability of eyewitness identifications will be beneficial to the jury, as 
well as discretion to redact portions of an identification in rare cases 
pursuant to New Jersey’s version of the Federal Rule of Evidence 403.103 
Finally, the last piece to the Henderson test takes into account that 
jurors often “do not evaluate eyewitness memory in a manner consistent 
with psychological theory and findings.”104 Instead, jurors tend to 
deprioritize factors such as distance and lighting, while giving 
disproportionate weight to factors such as the witness’s confidence.105 The 
 
 99.  COMM. ON MODEL CRIM. JURY CHARGES, NON 2C CHARGES: IDENTIFICATION: 
IN AND OUT-OF-COURT IDENTIFICATIONS (Sept. 4, 2012), https://www.judiciary. 
state.nj.us/attorneys/assets/criminalcharges/idinout.pdf. 
 100.  Henderson, 27 A.3d at 919. 
 101.  Id. at 920–22. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  See id. at 925 (explaining that although revised jury instructions should 
serve to reduce the need for such expert testimony, such discretion is allowed in 
the rare instance where a redaction accomplishes a balance between the need for 
relevant evidence and the prejudicial concerns of Rule 403); see also OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 40.160 (2017) (“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . .”). 
 104.  Brian L. Cutler et al., Juror Sensitivity to Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 
14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 185, 190 (1990). 
 105.  Id. 
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Henderson test, given the reality that most eyewitness identifications will 
be admitted, ensures that jurors receive adequate instructions about the 
many factors affecting identifications, some of which are not only non-
intuitive but counterintuitive.106 For example, while a juror may consider 
a witness’s confidence highly telling of the identification’s accuracy, 
confidence is a factor easily manipulated by suggestive techniques and 
may, therefore, be indicative that the identification is actually 
unreliable.107 The New Jersey Supreme Court charged the state’s Criminal 
Practice Committee and the Committee on Model Criminal Jury Charges 
with drafting revised jury instructions incorporating those system and 
estimator variables, which the court found to be supported by generally 
accepted scientific principles.108 Given the significant impact of own-race 
bias in eyewitness identifications,109 the court also charged the 
committees to draft a jury instruction specifically for cases involving 
cross-racial identification.110 
C.  Gaining Traction: Other States Join the Trend 
One year after the New Jersey Supreme Court decided Henderson, 
Oregon followed suit by announcing a similar test in State v. Lawson.111 
Lawson adopts many of the same scientific rationales as Henderson,112 and 
closely mirrors its discussion of system and estimator variables.113 The 
 
 106.  Henderson, 27 A.3d at 925 (“[W]hether the science confirms commonsense 
views or dispels preconceived but not necessarily valid intuitions, it can properly 
and usefully be considered by both judges and jurors in making their assessments 
of eyewitness reliability.”). 
 107.  See People v. LeGrand, 867 N.E.2d 374, 377 (2007) (citing 1 McCormick, 
Evidence § 206, at 880 (6th ed. 2006), for the premise that degree of confidence can 
be influenced by, for example, misleading questions asked after a witness’s 
viewing of a suspect). 
 108.  Henderson, 27 A.3d at 925–26; see also COMM. ON MODEL CRIM. JURY 
CHARGES, supra note 99. 
 109.  See, e.g., Christian A. Meissner & John C. Brigham, Thirty Years of 
Investigating the Own-Race Bias in Memory for Faces: A Meta-Analytic Review, 7 
PSYCHOL. PUB., POL’Y, & L. 3, 21, 27 (2001) (finding, in thirty-nine studies and 
almost 5000 participants, that cross-racial identifications raise unique difficulties 
and a significant risk for misidentification). 
 110.  Henderson, 27 A.3d at 926 (broadening the Cromedy instruction from State 
v. Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457, 467 (N.J. 1999), on cross-racial identifications beyond 
only cases where identification is a critical issue in the case). 
 111.  State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673 (Or. 2012) (en banc). In Lawson, Oregon 
broke away from the reliability-focused Brathwaite doctrine still employed in 
federal and many state courts. See id. at 690 (rejecting Oregon’s 1979 Classen test 
for determining admissibility of eyewitness identifications). 
 112.  Id. at 685–86 (noting that over 2000 scientific studies on the reliability of 
eyewitness identifications had been conducted since Classen was decided in 1979). 
 113.  Id. at 686–88 (listing and defining system and estimator variables). 
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Lawson test consists of two prongs. First, if the defendant moves for a pre-
trial hearing, the State must show that the identification at issue meets 
Oregon’s evidentiary admissibility rules, which parallel requirements of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence.114 Next, the defendant must present 
evidence that the identification’s relevance is substantially outweighed by 
the risk of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, 
and undue delay or cumulative evidence.115 Evidence of a suggestive 
variable can “give rise to an inference of unreliability that is sufficient to 
undermine the perceived accuracy and truthfulness of an eyewitness 
identification—[and] only then may a trial court exclude [it] . . . .”116 If the 
court admits the identification, a defendant may present expert testimony 
on reliability issues with eyewitness identifications or request a jury 
instruction tailored to the reliability factors relevant to the case.117 
Massachusetts, in Commonwealth v. Gomes,118 took yet another route 
in its rejection of the Brathwaite framework. The court reformed its prior 
jury instructions on the reliability of eyewitness identifications to include 
additional generally accepted principles.119 The Massachusetts Supreme 
Court reasoned that five scientific principles had reached the “near 
consensus in the relevant scientific community” sufficient to mandate 
inclusion in jury instructions, not as a replacement for but as a more 
robust counterpart to expert testimony on reliability.120 These factors 
include: (1) that memory consists of three processing stages, (2) that 
certainty alone does not indicate accuracy, (3) that high levels of stress 
may reduce ability to make an accurate identification, (4) that information 
unrelated to the actual viewing of the event received before or after 
making an identification can affect later recollection of the memory or the 
identification, and (5) that a viewing of a suspect in an identification 
procedure may negatively affect the reliability of a subsequent 
identification showing the same suspect.121 
Several states have, since Brathwaite, fashioned procedures for 
ensuring greater protections when the State in a criminal case seeks to 
introduce an eyewitness identification.122 However, New Jersey, Oregon, 
 
 114.  Id. at 696–97. 
 115.  Id. at 697 (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 40.160 (2017)). 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Commonwealth v. Gomes, 22 N.E.3d 897 (Mass. 2015). 
 119.  Id. at 911 (applying the scientific findings cumulated in ROBERT J. KANE ET 
AL., SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT STUDY GROUP ON EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE JUSTICES (2013), http://mass.gov/courts/docs/sjc/ 
docs/eyewitness-evidence-report-2013.pdf). 
 120.  Id. at 911–16. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Johnson, 45 N.E.3d 83, 92 (Mass. 2016) 
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and Massachusetts stand out as the three states who have subverted 
traditional assumptions about the reliability of such identifications and 
have reevaluated the right to stronger due process protections in light of 
their pitfalls.123 Alaska joined the fold in 2016, announcing an eyewitness 
identification admissibility test in Young v. State and serving as yet 
another beacon for states—as well as federal courts—to join eyewitness 
identification reform.124 
II. THE YOUNG TEST: ALASKA’S MODEL FOR CHANGE 
A.  Alaska Before Young 
Prior to Young, Alaska’s controlling case law on the admissibility of 
eyewitness identifications, Holden v. State,125 followed the Brathwaite 
doctrine without questioning its scientific validity.126 Much of Alaska’s 
case law—flowing from Brathwaite, Stovall, and Biggers—focused on 
merely applying the reliability elements to the facts of the case rather than 
providing any comprehensive explanation of the Holden test or any 
 
(“Where the suggestiveness does not arise from police conduct, a suggestive 
identification may be found inadmissible only where the judge concludes that it 
is so unreliable that it should not be considered by the jury. In such a case, a 
subsequent in-court identification cannot be more reliable than the earlier out-of-
court identification, given the inherent suggestiveness of in-court identifications 
and the passage of time.”); State v. Guilbert, 49 A.3d 705, 731 (Conn. 2012) (finding 
expert testimony on reliability appropriate because many factors influencing 
identifications are not naturally within the jury’s province); State v. Cabagbag, 277 
P.3d 1027, 1040 (Haw. 2012) (exercising court’s supervisory power to ensure that 
a special jury instruction is given on potential factors influencing an 
identification’s reliability upon defendant’s request); State v. Marquez, 967 A.2d 
56, 69–71 (Conn. 2009) (specifying detailed criteria for the assessment of 
suggestive behavior); State v. Clopten, 223 P.3d 1103, 1110, 1118 (Utah 2009) 
(finding broad cautionary instructions do not effectively assist juries in spotting 
misidentifications and calling for routine admission of expert testimony on 
reliability); Brodes v. State, 614 S.E.2d 766, 771, 771 n.8 (Ga. 2005) (rejecting 
certainty as a reliability factor); State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 591–92 (Wis. 
2005) (declaring showups to be inherently suggestive and revisiting Brathwaite 
and Biggers in light of recent scientific evidence which is “now impossible . . . to 
ignore”); State v. Hunt, 69 P.3d 571, 576 (Kan. 2003) (announcing a “refinement” 
of the federal due process test using five factors adopted in Ramirez); State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 780–81 (Utah 1991) (modifying three reliability factors to 
focus directly on impacts of suggestion). 
 123.  See generally Gomes, 22 N.E.3d. at 897 (Mass. 2015) (asserting new tests for 
admitting eyewitness identifications); State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673 (Or. 2012) (en 
banc); State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011). 
 124.  Young v. State, 374 P.3d 395, 427 (Alaska 2016). 
 125.  Holden v. State, 602 P.2d 452 (Alaska 1979), overruled by Young, 374 P.3d 
395. 
 126.  See id. at 456 (applying the admissibility test, including the “totality of the 
circumstances” language and Biggers factors, adopted in Brathwaite). 
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analysis of precisely how it corresponded with Alaska’s constitutional 
due process requirement.127 In Buchanan v. State,128 the court rejected the 
defendant’s request for an instruction focusing on possible inadequacies 
of an eyewitness identification at issue.129 While Buchanan was decided 
three months prior to Brathwaite, its holding regarding the necessity of 
jury instructions on the issue was not abrogated until 2016 by Young v. 
State.130 
In 2009, the court of appeals’ decision in Tegoseak v. State131 provided 
an impetus for reform. Before the grand jury that indicted Frank Tegoseak 
for driving under the influence and driving with a suspended license and 
at his subsequent trial, an eyewitness testified as to his impaired 
driving.132 The eyewitness had chosen Tegoseak out of a photographic 
lineup as the person he had seen driving in an impaired manner.133 
Despite flaws in the lineup procedure,134 the superior court, employing 
 
 127.  See Young, 374 P.3d at 406 n.31 (reviewing cases decided under the 
Brathwaite test and finding that, while such cases accepted the test as consistent 
with Alaska’s Constitution, explicit analysis of an unnecessary suggestiveness test 
was lacking); see, e.g., Viveros v. State, 606 P.2d 790, 792, 792 n.1 (Alaska 1980) 
(declining to adopt a per se rule of exclusion in evaluating a photographic lineup 
for police suggestiveness and reliability); Klockenbrink v. State, 472 P.2d 958, 961–
62 (Alaska 1970) (discussing the Stovall component of Brathwaite); Anderson v. 
State, 123 P.3d 1110, 1116 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005) (asserting that “the test in Alaska 
is the same one announced by the United States Supreme Court” as Alaska had 
never expressly rejected Brathwaite or Stovall). 
 128.  Buchanan v. State, 561 P.2d 1197 (Alaska 1977), abrogated by Young, 374 
P.3d 395. 
 129.  Id. at 1207. 
 130.  Young, 374 P.3d at 429. 
 131.  Tegoseak v. State, 221 P.3d 345 (Alaska Ct. App. 2009). 
 132.  Id. at 346. 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Tegoseak was in the passenger seat of the vehicle when it was stopped by 
police, but the dispatcher had been informed that the passenger and the driver 
had switched places. Id. at 347. Thus, it was suspected that Tegoeseak had been 
the driver who may have been intoxicated. Id. To account for there having been 
multiple men in the car, police showed the eyewitness two photo arrays. Id. at 348. 
Tegoseak was included in the second one, but not the first. Id. Upon being shown 
the first photo array, the witness selected two photos that could have been one of 
the passengers, one of which was correct, and also incorrectly identified Tegoseak. 
Id. Knowing that the identification had been incorrect, the officer conducting the 
photo lineup told the eyewitness to look at the second photo array and reminded 
the witness that he had identified one of two men as the person who had been in 
the driver’s seat, therefore suggesting that he should look carefully for the person 
who had been in the passenger’s seat—that is, Tegoseak—in the second one. See 
id.; see also id. at 361. When the eyewitness viewed the second photo array, he 
indicated that picture number five, which was indeed Tegoseak, could have been 
the person he had observed, as could the picture he had identified in the first 
photo array. Id at 348. 
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Brathwaite, held that the identification was reliable and permitted 
admission of the evidence at trial.135 
Even before the New Jersey Supreme Court’s innovative discussion 
in Henderson, the Alaska court of appeals in Tegoseak endeavored to 
underscore the generally accepted scientific principles of human memory, 
its effect on eyewitness identifications, and the failure of the Brathwaite 
doctrine to consider these issues.136 In reviewing some of the then-current 
research on eyewitness identification reliability, the court stated that its 
goal was: 
[T]o acknowledge that psychological research into eyewitness 
identification has furnished new insights into the potential 
suggestiveness of identification procedures, and to point out 
that this research has illuminated the related problem that a 
suggestive identification procedure can work an after-the-fact 
alteration of a witness’s memory of a criminal episode.137 
B.  Answering Tegoseak’s Call in Young 
Seven years after Tegoseak, the Alaska Supreme Court took up the 
challenge to depart from Brathwaite in Young v. State.138 On August 15th, 
2008, following a string of violent incidents between the Bloods and the 
Crips gangs in Fairbanks, an SUV—inconsistently described as gray, 
silver, or white—approached two cars carrying Bloods gang-members.139 
Occupants of the SUV then began shooting at one of the cars, which led 
to a high-speed shootout for approximately two miles.140 
Arron Young was arrested in connection with the shooting later that 
evening.141 The key to a silver SUV was found in his pocket and a gun was 
recovered from his waistband.142 Young was indicted by a grand jury for 
attempted murder in the first degree as well as misconduct involving a 
weapon in the first degree.143 During the grand jury proceedings, the State 
presented three eyewitnesses to identify Young.144 The first witness, Jason 
 
 135.  Id. at 346. 
 136.  See id. at 353–60 (highlighting the weaknesses of the Biggers factors and 
assumptions inherent to the Brathwaite doctrine about the reliability of eyewitness 
identifications, as well as the changing attitude in the legal system toward such 
evidence following the implementation of DNA testing). 
 137.  Tegoseak, 221 P.3d at 363. 
 138.  See Young, 374 P.3d at 426–27 (announcing the replacement of Alaska’s 
adopted Brathwaite test). 
 139.  Id. at 399. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id. at 399–400. 
 144.  Id. at 399. 
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Gazewood, had contacted the police and reported that he had witnessed 
the shooting.145 The police interviewed him at his office and showed him 
a photographic lineup featuring six photographs.146 Gazewood identified 
Young’s photograph as most closely resembling the man he saw driving 
the SUV involved in the shooting.147 Before the grand jury, the second 
witness, Arles Arauz, identified Young as the driver of the SUV from a 
photographic lineup, even though he had informed police immediately 
following the shooting that he could not identify any of the assailants.148 
The third witness, John Anzalone, failed to select Young’s photograph 
when testifying before the grand jury.149 
Young moved to suppress the Gazewood pre-trial and in-court 
identifications on grounds that they were unnecessarily suggestive.150 The 
superior court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion, during which 
Gazewood testified that a detective had come to his office three days after 
the shooting, showed him six photographs without instructions, and, 
after Gazewood narrowed the photographs down to two choices and 
placed his finger hesitatingly on Young’s photograph, the detective told 
him to “trust your instincts.”151 Gazewood testified that he interpreted the 
comment to mean, “that’s the guy we want you to pick.”152 The superior 
court denied the motion pursuant to a Brathwaite analysis, finding that the 
photographic lineup was not unnecessarily suggestive because it had 
contained nothing to distinguish Young’s photograph from the others.153 
Further, the superior court determined that the detective’s comment was 
not suggestive and that it did not influence Gazewood’s identification.154 
The State disclosed to Young on the first day of his trial that 
Anzalone, despite failing to identify Young’s photograph before the 
grand jury, would identify Young at trial, as he had seen a photograph of 
Young on television a week before trial, recognized him, and identified 
him.155 Young argued that the in-court identification would be 
improperly suggestive because he would be the only African-American 
man sitting with the defense and the previous identification (which was 
 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Id. at 400. 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Id. at 400–01. 
 154.  Id. at 401 (stating also that “even if the procedure was unnecessarily 
suggestive, Gazewood’s identification of Young was still reliable under the 
totality of the circumstances and therefore admissible”). 
 155.  Id. 
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unreliable due to the pretrial publicity) could not overcome the problem 
of racially-biased suggestiveness.156 The court ruled that Anzalone could 
not testify about his pre-trial identification, but that an in-court 
identification was permissible.157 The court also denied Young’s request 
for jury instructions identifying factors which may influence the 
reliability of eyewitness identifications or a set of instructions approved 
in United States v. Telfaire.158 
Lastly, Young filed for a mistrial because the court admitted an 
identification of Young by Arauz, which he had made the night of the 
shooting after initially denying his ability to recognize the assailants.159 
Arauz was formerly associated with the Bloods and knew Young, as the 
two had been involved in a fight during high school.160 The State did not 
disclose the Arauz identification to Young until mid-trial.161 Again, 
Young was denied relief.162 
Young was convicted, and argued on appeal that the admission of 
the Gazewood and Anzalone identifications constituted error under 
Brathwaite.163 He also challenged the superior court’s rejection of his 
proposed jury instructions and refusal to grant him a mistrial.164 The court 
of appeals affirmed the conviction, and Young petitioned the Alaska 
Supreme Court, urging it to abandon Brathwaite, adopt a new eyewitness 
identification admission test pursuant to the Alaska Constitution’s due 
process clause, and reverse his conviction.165 
Young’s petition presented a ripe opportunity for the Alaska 
Supreme Court to craft a new test, one which would, like Tegoseak, take a 
“close look at the scientific evidence related to eyewitness identifications 
and . . . change the standards for determining their admissibility and the 
instructions that inform juries about how to assess their weight.”166 
Applying Brathwaite to the facts of Young, the court found that the 
admission of the Gazewood identification was harmless error and that the 
due process protections against unnecessarily suggestive identifications 
did not apply to Anzalone’s in-court identification.167 However, the court 
 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  Id. at 403; see also United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 558–59 (D.C. Cir. 
1972) (detailing a widely-recognized cautionary instruction for juries considering 
eyewitness testimony). 
 159.  Young, 374 P.3d at 402. 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Id. at 404. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Id. at 405. 
 167.  Id. 
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then declared that changed circumstances justified replacing Brathwaite 
moving forward.168 
These “changed circumstances” related to scientific developments 
on the reliability of eyewitness identifications and courts’ responses, 
which had weakened the Alaska Supreme Court’s confidence that 
Brathwaite afforded due process protections under the Alaska 
Constitution.169 While studies on eyewitness reliability began prior to 
Brathwaite, a much higher rate of research into the processes and fallibility 
of memory took place in the decades to follow.170 Because New Jersey 
incorporated much of this scientific research into the opinion and Special 
Report of Henderson, the Young court reviewed and adopted those 
findings, as well as findings by other state courts and committees 
concerning eyewitness identifications.171 
Closely adhering to the framework of Henderson,172 Young required a 
criminal defendant to present evidence of suggestiveness in the form of 
system variables, not estimator variables, capable of resulting in a 
misidentification to receive an evidentiary hearing.173 Young’s non-
exclusive list of system variables includes blind administration, pre-
identification instructions, compositions of lineups and photographic 
arrays, feedback from law enforcement and recording confidence at the 
time of identification, showups (which become less reliable within two 
hours of the event witnessed), and multiple viewings (as initial viewings 
may decrease the reliability of subsequent viewings).174 The estimator 
variables illustrated by Young—which come into play later in the test—
also are not exclusive.175 They include the witness’s stress, weapons focus, 
duration of the viewing, environmental conditions of the viewing, 
 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  Id. at 413. 
 170.  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT: ASSESSING 
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 16 (2014). 
 171.  See generally State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 892 (N.J. 2011); REPORT OF 
THE SPECIAL MASTER, supra note 7, at 8–14; KANE ET AL., supra note 119; see also 
Commonwealth v. Gomes, 22 N.E.3d 897, 905, 909–10 (Mass. 2015); State v. 
Guilbert, 49 A.3d 705, 720–22 (Conn. 2012); State v. Cabagbag, 277 P.3d 1027, 1035–
38 (Haw. 2012); State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 685 (Or. 2012); State v. Clopten, 223 
P.3d 1103, 1108 (Utah 2009); and State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 591–92 (Wis. 
2005) (laying out relevant scientific data and principles which the Young court 
evaluated along with the rationales and evidence behind the Henderson test to 
determine the test’s fit with Alaska’s constitutional requirements). 
 172.  Henderson, 27 A.3d at 919–22 (announcing its admissibility test and lists 
of system and estimator variables, which Young substantially adopts). 
 173.  Young, 374 P.3d at 427. 
 174.  Id. at 417–22. 
 175.  See id. at 417 (noting that “the science of eyewitness identifications is 
‘probabilistic’” and seeking to identify “variables that are relevant to evaluating 
the risk of a misidentification”). 
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witness characteristics (such as physical and mental health, vision, age, 
and alcohol or drug use), perpetrator characteristics (such as a disguise or 
change in appearance between the event and the viewing), race and 
ethnicity bias, memory decay or a long interval between the event and the 
identification, and the presence of co-witnesses (who may contaminate 
the independence of an identification).176 Importantly, the threshold 
showing to trigger this pretrial hearing need not rise to the level of 
“unnecessarily suggestive.”177 Rather, demonstrating that the 
identification involved a system variable is sufficient for the defendant to 
be entitled to an evidentiary hearing.178 
At that hearing, the State must present evidence of reliability 
notwithstanding the presence of one or more system variables, and the 
court’s “ensuing analysis of reliability should consider all relevant system 
and estimator variables under the totality of the circumstances.”179 The 
defendant carries the burden to prove, given all the system and estimator 
variables at play, that there is a “very substantial likelihood of irreparable 
misidentification.”180 
Should the defendant fail to meet his or her burden in the 
evidentiary hearing, the court should admit the identification subject to 
an appropriate jury instruction which takes into account the Young test 
and the factors which may influence a given identification’s reliability.181 
As the New Jersey court did in Henderson, the Alaska Supreme Court also 
charged the Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions Committee with drafting 
a new set of model instructions consistent with the scientific principles 
and admissibility test announced in Young.182 As an additional measure, 
the court encouraged expert testimony that “explains, supplements, or 
challenges the application of these variables to different fact situations”—
especially given the continually changing nature of scientific 
understandings, which may move beyond those currently recognized.183 
 
 
 
  
 
 176.  Id. at 422–26. 
 177.  Id. at 427. 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 180.  Id. (citing to the standard of proof from State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 
920 (N.J. 2011)). 
 181.  Id. at 427–28 (acknowledging that scientifically valid principles are not 
necessarily within the jury’s province of knowledge, and thus, reliability 
characteristics may contradict commonsense assumptions). 
 182.  Id. at 428. 
 183.  Id. at 427. 
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CONCLUSION 
Combining these safeguards to prevent the injustice that can occur 
at the hands of a misidentification, Young adopts a model that has the 
potential to more effectively provide due process of law, where a high 
misidentification rate and a correspondingly high wrongful conviction 
rate show that such a model is desperately needed.184 
The test Young announced enhances due process protections for 
criminal defendants, but it does not solve the issues of jury bias and 
mistaken assumptions about reliability. The jury instruction mandate 
given by the Young court aims to alleviate these problems by challenging 
assumptions and putting triers of fact on notice of risks they might not 
otherwise consider in evaluating testimony.185 However, due process 
does not and cannot prevent the introduction of internally-held biases 
into the criminal justice system any more than it can mandate that juries 
understand and thoughtfully consider all relevant scientific data in 
reaching a verdict. For instance, while the court could not invoke the due 
process clause to prevent admission of John Anzalone’s in-court 
identification in response to seeing a photograph of Arron Young on 
television,186 the advancements made by the Alaska Supreme Court 
through Young, as well as in states whose eyewitness identification 
admissibility doctrines preceded it, illustrate that improvement is 
possible. In 1977, only five factors were considered relevant enough to the 
issue of reliability to warrant consideration by a court where extremely 
influential eyewitness evidence was at issue.187 Science and law have 
advanced greatly in the past forty years, but if Brathwaite illustrates any 
point, it is that progress must breed more progress, not entrenchment of 
currently-accepted principles.188 
By adopting a test based on up-to-date scientific principles, Young 
did more than provide a comprehensive list of the reliability factors 
accepted in today’s scientific community. The test the Alaska Supreme 
 
 184.  See Eyewitness Misidentification, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Eyewitness-Misidentification. 
php (last visited Feb. 12, 2018) (asserting that eyewitness misidentifications are 
the “greatest contributing factor to wrongful convictions proven by DNA testing,” 
involved in over 70% of convictions nationwide overturned on account of DNA 
evidence). 
 185.  Young, 374 P.3d at 428. 
 186.  Id. at 410–11. 
 187.  Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114–16 (1977) (following the factors 
laid out in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199–200 (1972)). 
 188.  Young, 374 P.3d at 414–17 (noting the explosion of scientific research since 
Brathwaite and the fact that the Brathwaite test no longer serves its purposes in light 
of those insights). 
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Court formulated, based on the careful and well-grounded analysis in 
Henderson, achieved two overarching goals. First, Young and Henderson 
recognized the intertwined nature of the two prongs of Brathwaite which 
had been previously treated as distinct: suggestive techniques and what 
are considered “inherent” reliability factors such as a witness’s 
confidence.189 Second, even current understanding about the risks of 
misidentifications190 and the counterintuitive factors influencing 
reliability191 are subject to evolution.192 Exclusive tests not only lead to 
“checklist” judicial decision-making but also lie in certain danger of 
becoming obsolete, while due process hangs in the balance. No test can 
be completely cognizant of the multitude of influences that may affect any 
given identification, and neither the Young test nor its counterparts fully 
regulate the wide range of estimator variables that may exist.193 However, 
even if the protections provided in Young and its counterparts are 
incomplete in their efforts to prevent unreliable eyewitness evidence, they 
are necessary to achieve compatibility between eyewitness identifications 
and due process. Young brings Alaska considerably closer to that goal. 
 
 
 189.  Id. at 426 (stating that the “certainty-inflation effect [produced by 
feedback from law enforcement or other witnesses] is greater for eyewitnesses 
who make mistaken identifications than it is for those who make accurate 
identifications”). 
 190.  See GARRETT, supra note 62, at 80–81 (noting that suggestive procedures 
and misidentifications are part of a larger problem in aligning criminal justice 
with modern science). 
 191.  See Young v. Conway, 698 F.3d 69, 79 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that reliability 
factors are “not coterminous with ‘common sense’”). 
 192.  Young, 374 P.3d at 427. 
 193.  See Nichols v. Eckert, 504 P.2d 1359, 1362 (Alaska 1973) (holding that the 
Due Process Clause only regulates state action and requires “deprivation of an 
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